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points in relationship to the number of 
instructions in the program." Apple, 
714 F.2d at 1245. Franklin defended, 
however, that the operating programs 
were not copyrightable; first, because 
they are embedded on a micro~chip and 
are therefore a form of machinery and 
second, because they cannot be distin~ 
guished from the concept of operating 
the computer system, they are more 
than the mere expression of an idea. 
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 102 
(1976). 
Both of Franklin's arguments were 
rejected by the court which reasoned 
that the programs do not meet the 
requirements of the Copyright Act of 
1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. The 
programs are "literary works," and they 
are "fixed in [a] tangible medium of 
expression." Id. at § 102(a). The court 
went on to hold that "the medium is not 
the message" and the fact that a program 
is recorded on a device which is part of 
the machinery is a mere change in the 
tangible form. Apple, 714 F .2d at 1251. 
In response to Franklin's second argu~ 
ment that an operating system is a mere 
method of operation and not protected, 
the court relied on Congress's Commis~ 
sion on New Technological Uses report 
which stated "[t]hat the words of a 
program are used ultimately in the 
implementation of a process should in 
no way affect their copyrightability." id. 
The court also found that Apple was 
seeking only to copyright the instructions 
and not the computer operating method. 
With the growing number of personal 
computers in businesses and private 
homes throughout the United States, 
this decision protects not only large 
computer companies such as Apple, but 
also the individual computer operator 
who creates hislher own operating 
program. ~ 
by Sylvia Halkousis 
LACK OF JURY 
IMPARTIALITY REQUIRED 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
I n McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, _ U.S. _ (1984), the United States Supreme Court 
clarified the bases upon which a motion 
for new trial made as a result of a juror's 
failure to disclose information on voir 
dire will be granted. To prevail upon 
such a motion, a party must show that a 
juror's answer to a material question on 
voir dire was dishonest and that had the 
juror answered honestly, grounds estab~ 
lishing a challenge for cause would have 
been present. 
In McDonough Power, Billy Greenwood 
and his parents brought suit against 
McDonough Power Equipment Incor~ 
porated to recover damages for injuries 
sustained by Billy when his feet came in 
contact with the blades of a riding lawn 
mower manufactured by McDonough, 
Inc. During voir dire, prospective jurors 
were asked if they or any of their family 
members had ever sustained a severe 
injury. One individual, who eventually 
became a member of the jury, failed to 
respond to this question. After the trial, 
the United States District Court entered 
judgment upon a jury verdict for 
McDonough, Inc. 
After entry of the judgment, the 
Greenwoods requested and received 
permission to approach the jurors in an 
attempt to elicit information regarding 
injuries sustained by them or members 
of their families. Despite discovery of 
evidence that a juror had not disclosed 
information regarding such injuries, the 
district court denied the Greenwood's 
motion for a new trial, stating that the 
jury verdict was fair and well~supported. 
The Greenwoods appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
which reversed the district court judg~ 
ment. In Greenwood v. McDonough Power 
Equipment, Inc., 687 F.2d338 (10th Cir. 
1982), the court of appeals held that the 
Greenwood's right of per~emptory 
challenge had been prejudiced because 
of the juror's failure to respond to a 
question on voir dire. To cure the error 
of the juror's "probable bias," a new 
trial was granted. The Supreme Court 
however, reversed, holding that a new 
trial will not be granted unless a juror's 
nondisclosure results in a partial jury. 
The court's opinion begins by tracing 
the legislative and judicial history of the 
harmless error rules. These rules were 
adopted to curb the abuses of appellate 
review procedures because at one time 
"courts of review tower[ ed] above the 
trials... as impregnable citadels of 
technicality" with trials representing 
attempts to get reversible error on the 
record. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 
U.S. 750, 759 (1946). The effect of the 
harmless error rules is that courts, in 
their judgment, can disregard errors in 
the proceeding which do not interfere 
with the fairness of the trial. 
continued on page 24 
RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME 
F or the first time in Maryland, a trial court has held that expert testimony on the victim's emo~ 
tional trauma is admissible in a rape 
case to show the victim did not consent 
to intercourse. State v. Allewalt, docket 
No. 83~CR~2517 (Circuit Court for 
Baltimore County November 4, 1983). 
Relying on consent as his defense, 
Allewalt was convicted of rape after a 
psychiatrist described the symptoms 
the complainant suffered, and testified 
that they were attributable to the 
emotional condition known as rape 
trauma syndrome. 
Rape trauma syndrome is a specific 
type of stress disorder which arises 
from the emotional impact of being 
raped. The symptoms most commonly 
associated with rape trauma syndrome 
include fear of men in general, fear of 
being alone, fear of being raped again, 
disturbance in sleep habits, loss of 
appetite, depression, and a sense of 
shame. 
Without the support of expert 
testimony on rape trauma syndrome, 
the defense of consent was often 
difficult to disprove because of lack of 
physical evidence. Many times the 
decision in such a case would be based 
solely on the testimony of the com~ 
plainant and defendant; therefore, the 
credibility of each testimony was 
critical in the determination of the 
outcome. By allowing the expert to 
testify, the complainant's testimony 
that she did not consent to intercourse 
can be corroborated by the testimony 
of a psychiatrist. Rape trauma testimony, 
therefore, could significantly strengthen 
the prosecution's case. 
Only a handful of states have directly 
decided the issue of admissibility of rape 
trauma syndrome. Minnesota, the only 
state with more than one decision on 
point, has held that the admission of 
expert testimony on rape trauma 
syndrome is reversible error. State v. 
Fall, 1984/The Law Forum-ll 
Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227,232, (Minn. 
1982). The Minnesota courts rely on 
two arguments: One, the issue of 
consent is within the comprehension of 
the jury; therefore, the jury is not helped 
by the expert testimony. Two, the 
probative value of rape trauma syndrome 
is outweighed substantially by the undue 
prejudice it places on the defendant. 
"Permitting a person in the role of an 
expert to suggest that because the 
complainant exhibits some of the 
symptoms of rape trauma syndrome, the 
complainant was therefore raped, un, 
fairly prejudices the appellant by 
creating an aura of special reliability and 
trustworthiness." State v. Saldana, 324 
N.W.2d 227,230 (Minn. 1982). 
In a similar opinion, the Missouri 
Supreme Court ruled that expert 
testimony on rape trauma syndrome is 
inadmissible because of its highly 
prejudicial nature. State v. Taylor, 661 
S.W.2d 794 (Mo. App. 1983). "The 
jury was competent to determine the 
victim's credibility, therefore testimony 
designed to invest scientific cachet on 
the critical issue (consent) was errone, 
ously admitted. Otherwise, trials would 
degenerate to a battle of experts 
expressing opinion on the substance of 
witness veracity," State \!. Taylor, 661 
S.W.2d 794 (Mo. App. 1983). 
The Supreme Court of Kansas, on the 
other hand, held that rape trauma 
syndrome is relevant and admissible 
when the issue of consent is raised. In 
reaching this decision, the court ex, 
amined the relevant literature from the 
field of psychiatry and found that rape 
trauma syndrome is a detectable and 
reliable reaction to a forced sexual 
assault. The Kansas court has in effect 
given judicial approbation to rape 
trauma syndrome. State v. Marks, 231 
Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982). 
In People v. Bledsoe, 189 Cal. Rptr. 
726 (App. 1983), the California Court 
of Appeals also found rape trauma 
syndrome admissible. The court stated 
that although expert testimony serves to 
reinforce the credibility of the com, 
plainant, the purpose behind allowing 
such testimony is to impeach the 
defendant's testimony regarding con, 
sent; therefore, the expert testimony is 
admissible to rebut the defense of 
consent. 
The standard adopted by the Maryland 
Court of Appeals for determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony is set 
out in Frye\!. U.S., 54 U.S. App. D.C. 46 
(1923). The court in Frye held that the 
first step in determining admissibility is 
to show that the expert testimony would 
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be of appreciable help to the jury. The 
ordinary knowledge of the jury must be 
insufficient to competently analyze the 
relevant issue before testimony of 
persons with skill and expertise in the 
area is required. 
Once the helpfulness of the expert 
testimony is established, the second step 
as set out in Frye is to determine whether 
the underlying scientific principle relied 
on by the expert has been sufficiently 
established to h~ve gained general 
acceptance in the relevant scientific 
field. This issue must be addressed and 
answered by the court before the 
evidence can be admitted. 
Although the court in Allewalt did not 
state specifically the basis for its holding, 
by allowing the expert testimony and 
denying the defense's motion for new 
trial based on that issue, the trial court in 
effect has given judicial approval of rape 
trauma syndrome as a means of deciding 
the issue of consent. To reach this 
conclusion, the court must have decided 
that rape trauma syndrome meets the 
standard set out in Frye. The defense, 
believing that rape trauma syndrome has 
not met this standard, has filed an appeal 
and plans to petition for certiorari to the 
court of appeals. 
There are three major arguments 
against the general admissibility of rape 
trauma syndrome the defense can rely 
on for its appeal. First, the trial court 
erred in not ruling directly on the issue 
of whether rape trauma syndrome has 
met the standard set out in Frye. See also 
People v. Bledsoe, 189 Cal. Rptr. 727, 
733 (App. 1983) (Weiner, A.J., dis, 
senting). Second, the symptoms associated 
with rape trauma syndrome are common 
with those which result from any 
number of stressful events; therefore, it 
is neither a reliable nor detectable 
method to determine the issue of 
consent. (Freeman, Kaplan and Sadock, 
Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry 
1517,25 (3d ed. 1980); American 
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
236,38 (3d ed. 1980)). See also People v. 
Bledsoe, 189 Cal. Rptr. 727, 733 (App. 
1983) (Weiner, A.J., dissenting). Third, 
the issue of consent is not the type of 
complex issue for which the jury needs 
the assistance of expert testimony. By 
allowing the experts to testify when it is 
unnecessary, the province of the jury is 
invaded. State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 
227 (Minn. 1982). Generally, the 
opponents of rape trauma syndrome feel 
the highly prejudicial nature substantially 
outweighs any probative value that it 
might have; therefore, evidence of rape 
trauma syndrome should not be admitted 
into evidence. 
The trial court's decision in State v. 
Allewalt was a Maryland first, involving 
the relatively new legal issue of allowing 
expert testimony on the existence of 
rape trauma syndrome. By allowing such 
testimony, the trial court has provided 
an entirely new approach to prosecuting 
rape cases where consent is raised as the 
defense. Whether this approach will be 
available to Maryland prosecutors in the 
future will depend on whether the 
Allewalt decision survives the judicial 
scrutiny of the Maryland Appellate 
Courts. m 
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